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“Delayed Disclosure”:  
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The significance of Edward Snowden’s revelations has been viewed primarily through 
the prism of threats to citizen privacy. We argue instead that the most dramatic change 
has been a decline of government secrecy, especially around national security. While 
the ethical aspects of state secrets and “whistle-blowing” have received recent 
attention, few have attempted to explain the dynamics of this growing climate of 
exposure. Our argument is largely technological and we ground our analysis in the 
changing nature of intelligence work, which is increasingly merging with big data. But 
we also identify a related cultural change: many intelligence contractors are at best 
agnostic about the national security state. Meanwhile, the Internet itself provides the 
perfect medium for the anonymous degradation of secrets. Because the main driver is 
technology, we suggest this trend is likely to accelerate, presenting national security 





Open societies are increasingly defended by secret means. Since the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, spending on intelligence, security, counter-terrorism and cyber security has 
doubled and redoubled again, creating a vast secret empire. The English-speaking 
world spends over $100 billion a year on intelligence alone. In the United States, over 
five million people enjoy security clearances. The defence of democracy by furtive 
intelligence and security services that resist democratic control has long presented us 
with a profound paradox (Born and Leigh, 2005: 16).  The idea of sustaining a 
multinational ring of secrecy that is populated by millions of people has arguably 
transformed something that is puzzling into something that is increasingly improbable.  
Advanced liberal democracies are committed to keeping their secrets. In the 
United States, an estimated $11 billion is spent every year on security classification, 
double the amount expended at the turn of the century (Shane, 2012). This figure does 
not include the statistics for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National 
Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), or the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), whose budgets remain classified. In 
Australia, the government’s program of security vetting costs the taxpayer an annual 
$350 million, with clearances required for even the most innocuous of public service 
jobs far removed from the national security realm, including librarians, museum staff, 
and veterinarians (Thompson, 2015). Meanwhile, governments are now more energetic 
than ever in using the courts to punish “whistle-blowers” as well as the journalists who 
work with them.  
The Obama administration arrived at the White House in Washington promising 
to run the most transparent administration in history. Despite some early gestures 
towards transparency – for example, an Executive Order in December 2009 banning 
indefinite classification and advising officials not to follow the age-old mantra of “when 
in doubt, classify” – in reality it pursued the path of silence and censorship whenever it 
was confronted by challenge. To the dismay of human rights activists Obama used the 
1917 Espionage Act to prosecute more whistle-blowers than all his predecessors 
combined. Many of these issues were not related to national security but instead related 
to waste, corruption and fraud within government. His successor in the White House, 
Donald J. Trump, could well break this record. Less than a year into office, he has 
already made bold promises on Twitter to root out “low-life leakers” in the government 
(van Buren, 2012; Moran & Aldrich, 2017).  
However, while the appetite for secrecy remains strong, the ability to achieve it 
has never looked weaker, largely due to new electronic platforms. Since 2010 and the 
publication by WikiLeaks of 250,000 diplomatic cables from US embassies and 
consulates around the world, plus some half a million records from the conflicts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, “document dumps” of sensitive information have become 
commonplace and part of a new media landscape. Known as “Cablegate”, the leaking 
of US embassy cables by WikiLeaks was said by the State Department to have put the 
lives of US informants at risk, whilst foreign leaders embarrassed by the leaked material 
sent angry private letters to Washington demanding apologies. On 29 October 2013 at 
a Goldman Sachs summit in Arizona, former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told 
the audience of bankers that she was forced to go on a ‘global apology tour’ after 
Cablegate, adding, only half in jest, that she witnessed statesmen in tears. More 
recently, Clinton herself was caught in the tidal wave of disclosure, with some 30,000 
of her private emails whilst Secretary of State being published by WikiLeaks at a 
critical moment in the 2016 presidential election campaign. She and her top aides 
believe that this may have cost her the White House (Friedman 2015).   
Most impacted by the tsunami of electronic transparency have been intelligence 
and security agencies like the American NSA and Britain’s Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), together with the various tech giants like 
Google, Facebook, and Verizon that have formed witting or unwitting partnerships with 
secret bodies. Famously, in June 2013, Edward Snowden leaked to the Washington Post 
and the Guardian an estimated 200,000 documents detailing highly classified US/UK 
surveillance programs, sparking an international furore. More recently, the CIA has 
been embarrassed by the loss of the hacking tools it uses to compromise smart phones 
and televisions, turning them into improvised surveillance devices. Unsurprisingly, 
these disclosures have placed officials in London and Washington on notice, fearing 
what will be revealed next.  
Precisely because these secret agencies have chosen to weaponize the Internet 
they have provoked protest from external constituencies. Many software developers 
and IT specialists still identify with figures like web guru and political activist John 
Perry Barlow, who articulated a utopian high-tech libertarianism and penned a 
declaration of independence for the Internet. Privacy campaigners and hacktivists also 
envisaged the Internet as part of a utopian realm in which the new information and 
communication technologies would change the ways in which citizens communicate, 
collaborate and indeed pursue political activism (Kelty, 2005). These groups, which 
might be conceptualized as online social movements, are vigorously committed to the 
demise of government secrecy, not least because they see the secret state as a direct 
threat to their own space, undermining everything that makes the Internet creative and 
free, while generating paranoia. David Lyon has suggested that the Snowden 
revelations are of the biggest importance for those concerned about the future of the 
Internet (Lyon, 2015b). Others have insisted that Snowden alerts us to a military-
information-complex in which a few powerful companies are in league with the 
surveillance state (Fuchs, 2015).  
Because the Snowden phenomenon has been largely analysed thought the prism 
of citizen privacy there is surprising dearth of research on the decline of state secrecy. 
Despite some recent normative and ethical contributions (Leigh & Harding, 2011; 
Lester, 2015; Sagar, 2013: Schoenfeld, 2011) we know little about what is actually 
going on in this realm. Instead, social scientists have tended to focus on new 
surveillance technologies and their potential dystopian consequences for civil liberties 
(Gates, 2011; Goold, 2004; Rule, 2007; Vincent, 2016; Wicker, 2013). A significant 
body of literature has emerged on Snowden, but the analysis is largely through the lens 
of growing ethical concerns about the ability of governments to monitor every aspect 
of our digital lives (Bauman et al 2014, Edgar, 2017; Greenwald, 2014; Harding, 2014; 
Johnson, 2014; Lyon, 2015a). Partly as a result of recent interest in language, identity 
and the social construction of security, the subject of privacy, which concerns people 
and public discourse, is in scholarly vogue, especially when compared to the 
conventional and cloistered world of bureaucrats. The only exception is perhaps 
economists who have begun to model the transaction costs of secrecy within both 
liberal and planned economies (Harrison, 2013). However, we would we argue that 
while the changing nature of privacy over the last decade is undoubtedly important, it 
is only part of the picture. As much as there is a “crisis of privacy”, there is also a “crisis 
of secrecy”. From the perspective of officials, the most worrying issue is not 
government looking at us – but us looking at government. Secrecy, as Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr. (1987) wrote, is a source of state power. It enables governments to plan, 
predict and even forecast, away from glare of their enemies and free from the hubbub 
of the political marketplace. Less benignly, it is also a way to cover up 
‘embarrassments, blunders, follies and crimes of the ruling regime’ (Schlesinger, 
1987). Understandably, therefore, officials look at recent developments with alarm.  
This article seeks to explore and understand the drivers behind this current crisis 
of secrecy. In an important intervention, published in 1998, Ann Florini suggested that 
governments and corporations were being pulled into the open by the triple processes 
of democratization, globalization and information technology, writing: ‘With the 
spread of democratic norms, it seems right that powerful entities such as states and 
corporations should be held accountable for their behaviour. Now, as the world shrinks, 
a lot of people want to have a say in what used to be other people’s business’. Florini 
connected this process closely with globalization, insisting that ever-tightening 
connections created by trade resulted in strong pressures for better ways to govern the 
growing number of transnational interactions (1998). In areas as diverse as 
environmental politics and the regulation of financial markets there has been a growing 
assumption that transparency is one of the keys to effective governance (Gupta, 2008).  
More recently, Florini has suggested that national security has become a realm 
of increasing exception, one where ‘transparency gives way to secrecy’. In the post-
9/11 era she warned that the ‘growing US penchant [for secret government] … threatens 
to undermine a global trend toward greater transparency everywhere’ (Florini, 2004). 
In this context, she pointed to the Patriot Act and Homeland Security Act, passed in 
2001 and 2002 respectively, which introduced numerous provisions blocking citizen 
access to information. Yet despite considerable efforts to shore up state secrecy and the 
vast expenditure of resource, it is clear that this initiative is failing – and here we ask 
why? We argue that the Snowden leaks were symptomatic of wider and more important 
trends, including systematic changes in the nature of computing, together with the 
cultural attitudes of security contractors and the IT community. These trends 
increasingly overlap with an expanded intelligence community, the ability to share 
large volumes of data with allies, and the very nature of intelligence itself wherein the 
sources are themselves becoming increasingly unsecret. Indeed, we suggest that the 
very idea of ‘secret intelligence’ is beginning to look like a twentieth century concept 
and might well need to be revisited.  
Tacitly, leading western intelligence agencies have already begun to accept that 
secrets now decline more rapidly, often in unpredictable ways. In the 1990s, 
intelligence agencies in the UK embraced avowal and legal identities after years of 
dogged resistance and then discovered, to their surprise, that public acknowledgment 
of their existence did not cause them to melt into air (Phythian, 2007). Now, we are 
seeing an unexpected desire by the secret agencies to undertake public education, 
accepting that the failure to explain has a higher cost in an era when hacktivists 
potentially capture the moral high ground. Some of these changes are cultural but the 
main drivers are “big data” and new information and communication technology, the 
pace of which continues to accelerate remarkably. The outcome, to quote retired 
counterterrorism officer Mark Fallon, is a world in which ‘there are no secrets, only 
delayed disclosures’ (Watts, 2012).   
 
 
Theories of Secrecy 
The pioneering work on conceptions of secrecy has largely been undertaken by 
sociologists who have seen it as dependent on changing social relations. Writing in 
1908, Georg Simmel associated both surveillance and secrecy with the advance of 
modernity. He argued that in pre-modern society, a person’s immediate circle 
encompassed most of their existence, and so secrecy of any kind was difficult to 
achieve. By contrast, modern society saw a larger number of differentiated spaces and 
specialised roles, together with an increasing separation of the public and private 
spheres, and with this complexity came the increased possibility of secrecy (Marx and 
Muschert 2009; Curtin 2014). 
The strongest secrecy has been associated with a government monopoly of 
special types of information, often designed to accelerate the tactical efficiency of 
defence and foreign policy. Governments have jealously guarded the power to 
intentionally conceal information and the legal right to decide about disclosure. This 
sort of secrecy has had a dyadic quality; the wider population are often not aware that 
these government secrets even exist, something that has been termed ‘double secrecy’ 
or ‘deep secrecy’ (Pozen, 2010). Meanwhile, the most effective secrets are those 
obtained without the opponent knowing that this has happened, as in the case of 
wartime codebreaking at Bletchley Park, the so-called “Ultra Secret”. Secret 
intelligence has thus been defined as other people’s secrets stolen secretly (Robertson, 
1987: 46). 
Secrecy is often about government because it depends upon elaborate 
compartmentalization and classification. Accordingly, official secrecy has been 
constructed through a ritualistic system of distinguishing insiders from outsiders, with 
the highest clearances perceived as a form of status indicator (Schoenfeld 2010).  Costas 
and Gray have remarked on the ‘architectural’ quality of secrecy, denoting those on the 
centre and those consigned to the periphery (2016). Some have suggested that national 
security officials have come to view high levels of secrecy as intrinsic to their work, 
irrespective of whether there was a genuine need for it. Moynihan and Vincent have 
both argued that, in its most elaborate form, this spawned a ‘culture of secrecy’ in which 
‘secrecy for secrecy’s sake’ became a defining characteristic of government (Moynihan 
1999; Vincent 1998). 
Max Weber, writing towards the end of the First World War, was the first to 
identify this culture of secrecy. He argued that this attitude stretched far beyond those 
areas where circumstances might justify the demand for secrecy, or might even be 
convenient: ‘The concept of the “official secret” is the specific invention of 
bureaucracy, and nothing is so fanatically defended by the bureaucracy as this attitude, 
which cannot really be justified beyond these specifically qualified areas.’ In other 
words, bureaucratic secrecy had moved beyond merely covering up mistakes and 
abuses; it had become an end in itself. Weber argued that the security state’s fascination 
with secrecy had undermined the functioning of government and was at the centre of a 
failed war effort (Weber 1918: 730-31).  
Building on earlier conceptualisations, Steven Aftergood has identified three 
types of government secrecy. First, genuine national security secrecy that relates to the 
sort of information which, if disclosed, would damage public interests. Second, 
‘political secrecy’, which involves the deliberate employment of classification to hide 
abuses or government failure. And third, a pathological culture of secrecy that views 
everything as secret unless it is deemed otherwise. Importantly, Aftergood argues that 
secrecy and the production of knowledge are fundamentally in conflict, since scientific 
enterprise and academic research asserts the essential importance of the open exchange 
of information, which is the natural obverse of secrecy (Aftergood 2008: 399, 401-3). 
Complementing this analysis, albeit from a different disciplinary standpoint, Zygmunt 
Bauman et al have written about the changing nature of dichotomies between 
national/international, public/private, state/society, foreign/domestic, friend/foe, and 
the transmogrification of traditional clear-cut Weberian coordinates into a new 
interconnected topology of security, encapsulated by the metaphor of the ‘Möbius strip’ 
– a one-sided surface where the inside and the outside become blurred (Bauman et al: 
2014). It is precisely this collision of the old world of state secrecy and intelligence 
with the new world of innovation, information and interconnectivity, together with its 
impact on changing social relations, that we wish to explore here. 
 
Big Data and Knowledge Intensive Security 
The early twenty-first century is already being defined by big data computing across 
multiple domains together with remarkable interoperability and personal connectivity. 
The speed and scale of change is remarkable. IBM has estimated that 90% of the 
world’s data has been created in the last two years, with human beings generating a 
stunning 2.5 quintillion bytes of data every day. In 2012, the world sent over eight 
trillion text messages. Many farm animals now contain SIM cards that transmit their 
health status and equivalent body-monitoring for humans is already under trial. Cities 
like London and New York may even begin to “think” like organisms using smart roads 
and power grids. Not only will this data be of unimaginable size, it will be increasingly 
accessible from mobile devices that are ever more closely integrated with the human 
body and eventually the mind (Dragland, 2013).  
For governments, this vastly increased knowledge is simultaneously viewed as 
an important economic driver and also a security panacea in an uncertain world. 
Whether security challenges are conceived in terms of traditional battlefield combat, 
insurgency, international terrorism, organised crime, peacekeeping or humanitarian 
relief operations, the common response has been to turn to knowledge-intensive 
organisations that increasingly deploy big data to manage risk (Amoore, 2011). As the 
majority of security threats have moved down the spectrum, so the focus of intelligence 
and security agencies had shifted towards human beings, as opposed to military 
hardware. Today, humans emit what the CIA has described as a constant stream of 
‘electronic exhaust fumes’ as they live their lives (Zegart, 2007), and so intelligence  
sources can be as mundane as tweets, supermarket loyalty cards or gaming chat-rooms. 
Although traditional human intelligence or ‘espionage’ will not become 
altogether redundant in the digital age – indeed, CIA assessments of Kremlin 
interference in the 2016 US election were derived from human sources in Russian cyber 
outfits – big data is transforming the national security realm and opening the door to 
what we might call knowledge-intensive security. For example, the accessibility of 
large volumes of twitter feed raises the possibility of ‘social media intelligence’ in 
which scientists can seek to forecast future political trends across entire communities, 
cities or even countries. Could events like the Arab Spring have been forecast months 
ahead if the CIA had examined the twitter feed from Cairo or Tripoli in the right way? 
Scientists at MIT are convinced that they could. This sort of open source intelligence 
work looks less like traditional spying and more like the sort of large-scale behavioural 
research that academic sociologists longed to conduct in the 1970s, if only they had 
enjoyed access to enough data and computer power (Omand, 2015; Oh, Agrawal and 
Rao, 2013; Ruths and Pfeffer 2014).  
 The consequences of an intelligence world driven by big data are enormous and 
will take years, if not decades, to be fully understood. Yet, the implications for state 
secrecy are already revealing themselves. One of the fascinating features of this new 
landscape is the changing ownership of information. Unlike during the Cold War, 
secrets relating to security no longer belong to a few specialised government agencies 
and departments. Instead, they are dispersed throughout government, including local 
authorities and across business sub-contractors, partly because many of our new 
enemies are perceived to be within the ‘homeland’. Moreover, private organisations 
including banks, airlines and ISP providers now collect, store, and share sensitive 
information relating to this sort of security on an unprecedented scale – often across 
state boundaries. Airlines and airports are good examples of “dual use” private 
intelligence partners, operating both as vast collectors but also customers of refined 
data for their own commercial and security purposes (Adey 2009).  
Whistle-blowers and leakers thrive amid this new connected security activity. 
Edward Snowden is one of the clearest examples of this, sitting at a curious nexus 
between the state and the corporate and even between intelligence and information. A 
contractor for Dell and later Booz Hamilton, he extracted highly classified information 
not from NSA headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland, but from a regional operations 
center 5,000 miles away in Hawaii, which he knew lacked adequate security software 
(Mazzetti and Schmidt, 2013). Indeed, unlike the internal secure network at Fort 
Meade, it has been claimed that the Hawaii office did not have the latest ‘anti-leak 
software’ because the area network bandwidth to the outpost was not enough for it be 
downloaded (Gallagher, 2013). If secret agencies can only do their business by 
plugging into Internet Service Providers and social media, their expectations of secrecy 




Government has itself done much to accelerate the present crisis of secrecy. The 
devastating 9/11 attacks were followed by a major cultural shift across the Anglospheric 
security community from the idea of “Need to Know” to a new mantra of “Need to 
Share” (Dawes et al, 2009). The most visible evidence of this was at Britain’s technical 
intelligence agency GCHQ. Here, for almost half a century, intelligence work had been 
carried out on two sites dotted with fifty self-contained buildings that formed isolated 
security cells. Typically, the secretive civil servants that worked there might spend a 
twenty-year career in the unit that listened to the Soviet air force (J24) and so have little 
knowledge of what went on outside a single hut. Similar compartmentalization had also 
existed at Bletchley Park (Costas & Grey, 2016). In 2003, all this was replaced by “The 
Doughnut”, a vast circular building with a million square feet of office space that was 
for a while the largest building project in Europe. The most shocking thing for its new 
occupants was the open plan environment and hot-desking designed to encourage more 
interaction and a cultural ‘change journey’ within the organisation aimed at sharing 
widely (Crabb, 2005).   
Meanwhile, in the US, investigations such as the 9/11 Commission had laid 
much of the blame for the attacks on vertical stove-piping and compartmentalized 
hoarding of information, which meant that the right information did not get in the right 
hands at the right time. Given the cross-border nature of terrorist and criminal networks, 
with threats living in the seams of national jurisdictions, the solution, they argued, was 
greater intra and cross-governmental connectivity. The order of the day became, ‘play 
well with others’. However, it is now asserted by many national security practitioners 
that the recipe for correction went too far. Indeed, one State Department senior analyst 
has described what took place as ‘an irrational exuberance of sharing’ (Miller, 2011).  
 As a result of the newly enshrined emphasis on “Need to Share”, security 
clearances were given to excessive numbers of people, including private contractors. In 
the US, 5.1 million people have clearances for access to classified information – 
roughly equivalent to the population of Norway and nearly rivalling the population of 
metropolitan Washington. (Fung, 2014). Elsewhere, it has been reported that a 
staggering 500,000 to 600,000 military and diplomatic personnel had access to the 
Pentagon’s SIPRNet system that was used by Chelsea Manning, then a 22-year lowly 
Private First Class, to download a vast haul of classified material for onward 
dissemination to WikiLeaks (Sifry, 2011). Under political pressure to do more in the 
fight against global terrorism, government departments have been accused of following 
less than rigorous vetting procedures, routinely issuing ‘interim clearances’ based only 
on self-disclosures to allow people to work on secret projects for months, sometimes 
years, without proper checks. In spring 2007, the then Under-Secretary of Defense 
Robert Andrews wrote a sobering memo to his superiors in which he claimed that ‘Tens 
of thousands of people with classified access [have had] no comprehensive background 
investigation, creating an insider threat, the scope of which is unknown’ (Eisler and 
Vanden Brook, 2013). In January 2013, the BBC revealed that some 27 UK Chief 
Police officers did not possess up-to-date security clearance, owing to stretched 
resources (BBC News, 2013).  
In government, officials are only now waking up to the fact that, culturally, the 
expanded security workforce is very different to previous generations. Whereas 
working in the intelligence and security realm was once regarded as an honour and a 
privilege – CIA Director Richard Helms famously described it as a ‘calling’ – for many 
individuals today it is nothing more than a job, just like any other. Indeed, instead of 
building a career, many employees will join with every intention of staying only for a 
short time before moving on. Contractors are, by definition, nomadic. In this new 
revolving door environment, where security clearances at the Secret level are almost de 
rigueur, it stands to reason that there is not the same level of respect for traditional codes 
of secrecy. As privacy researcher Chris Soghioan has shown, many contractors will 
openly list their employment on classified programs on professional networking sites 
like LinkedIn, to enhance their employability (Swire, 2015: 5).  
Contrary to the shrill observations of praetorian security chiefs, Snowden is not 
the cause of the present crisis of secrecy, but rather he is symptomatic of the structural 
changes that have led to it. Indeed, Snowden is emblematic of a new kind of operative 
who exists in the liminal space between public and private, fostered by advanced 
networking technologies and the development of e-government. These networks view 
information sharing across traditional organizational boundaries as a primary virtue, 
seeking to use big data to address public needs that no single organization or jurisdiction 
can handle alone. But the work itself is far from glamorous and engenders little esprit 
de corps. Snowden was a community-college dropout who enlisted in the Army 
reserves only to wash out after 20 weeks, yet was privy to the innermost secrets of 
American intelligence gathering, working as a technician firstly for the CIA, where he 
left under a cloud, and then the NSA. United States Investigations Services Inc (USIS) 
– the contractor that screened Snowden – was investigated by the Justice Department 
for allegedly taking shortcuts when vetting federal employees. In August 2015, the 
company agreed to a settlement worth at least $30m (Hattem, 2015).  In short, the rapid 
growth of “Need to Share” has introduced multiple failure points, the most important 
of which are cultural (Andrews Burrough and Ellison, 2014).  
 
 
Computers and Counterculture 
The structural changes in intelligence and security agencies since 9/11 are important 
and have undoubtedly rendered them more porous. No less important is an earlier 
decision by government to seek an alliance with the information and communications 
technology industry that has its roots in end of the Cold War. The termination of a 
conflict with the Soviet Union that had lasted almost half a century and which had given 
shape and purpose to national security confronted the intelligence agencies with 
multiple problems. Although politicians took their time in calling for a peace dividend, 
major agencies found their funding cut by about 25 per cent. Meanwhile, a globalizing 
world was presenting a bewildering range of new threats like non-state terrorism and 
organised crime which, while not existential, required more resources, more languages, 
and more flexibility to track.  
 The biggest problem was the Internet itself. During the 1990s, the numbers of 
Internet users went from about four million to 361 million and the numbers of mobile 
phone users increased from sixteen million to 741 million (Aldrich, 2010: 486-7). In 
the 1980s email was an eccentric form of communications used by scientists in 
universities who wanted to chat online about quarks and quasars, but by 2002 the world 
was sending 31 billion emails a year. Fibre optic cables carried much of the traffic, but 
were difficult to tap into. Even if this tsunami of new electronic material could be 
collected and stored, analysing it seemed an impossible task. These required a broader 
range of skills and resources that were not available at that time to the relatively 
impecunious post-Cold War secret services (Aid, 2009).  
The NSA and GCHQ were confronted with the need to address breath-taking 
changes in the realm of information and communications technologies just at the time 
when their own resource base had been cut. Looking for radical changes in working 
practises, they turned to the private sector. Partnerships with large companies like Narus 
and Northrup Grumman delivered innovative approaches that allowed NSA to trawl the 
Internet, providing what the agency called ‘home field advantage’ over terrorist groups. 
Meanwhile privatising many of NSA’s logistical needs and back office functions 
allowed them to work a degree of budgetary magic. Booz Allen Hamilton was one of 
the major contractors that came to its assistance and one its employees was Edward 
Snowden. GCHQ moved down a similar path, with its mechanical engineering division 
(M Division) being entirely replaced by contracts to Vosper-Thorneycroft (Aldrich, 
2010).   
The 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq accelerated this process of 
privatisation. Although these events are symbolic of intelligence failure, in their wake 
they nevertheless brought a massive influx of additional resources. Under President 
George W. Bush, the American intelligence community budget increased from $45 
billion a year to $75 billion a year (Shane, 2012).  This is almost certainly a profound 
underestimation since the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan brought with them 
additional moneys that helped to boost reconnaissance and surveillance programs 
(Belasco and Daggett, 2004). Again, the private sector was the source of increased 
capacity and by 2007, contracting constituted more than half the intelligence budget 
(Shorrock, 2007). 
Retired NSA Director Michael Hayden believed that his alliance with the rising 
IT companies was the smartest thing he ever did (Hayden, 2016). However, he was 
strangely unaware of how ideologically antithetical some of his new allies were to 
traditional ideas of security and secrecy.  The possibility of insecurity by IT contractors 
is not just about a change from legacy state employees to career-mobile contractors. 
Instead, it is about an entirely different view of the Internet as something that is alien 
to the realist world of international security and its agencies. Peter Swire, an eminent 
privacy lawyer who served on Obama’s NSA review group in 2013, insists that this is 
signalled by the question of whether Snowden should be considered a traitor or a 
whistle-blower. During his work on the Review Group, Swire spoke with numerous 
people in the intelligence community. Not a single one said that Snowden was a 
whistle-blower, which in the US has positive connotations. The level of anger toward 
him was palpable. By contrast, a leader in a major Silicon Valley company said during 
the same period that more than 90 percent of his employees there would say that 
Snowden was a whistle-blower (Swire, 2015). The same ideological and generational 
gulf could be detected between traditional print media and social media (Qin, 2015). 
Swire describes this as a sociological chasm and notes that NSA and other secret 
agencies face a formidable problem: how to guard secrets when much of the 
information technology talent has anti-secret and libertarian inclinations (Swire 2015). 
The ire of Silicon Valley reached its peak after revelations about the physical 
subversion of the Internet. What has driven the technologists to distraction is increasing 
evidence that, over and beyond amassing data about ordinary citizens at a breath-taking 
pace (a largely passive activity), the agencies have been systematically undermining 
the security of the Internet and the software that the everyday citizen utilises. Anxious 
to appease Facebook’s 1.6 billion global users, founder and CEO Mark Zuckerburg has 
publicly criticised calls from securocrats for the presence of so-called back-doors into 
its encryption technology, even hinting that an internet bill of rights should be created 
to preserve digital freedoms. In March 2017, Brad Smith, President of Microsoft joined 
him, describing government hacking as state attacks on civilians in peacetime and 
calling for a Digital Geneva Convention that would ban such practices. He argues that 
that these activities by NSA, GCHQ and their partners in countries such as Israel, are 
damaging to the fundamental fabric of democratic society and threatening to destabilise 
systems on which entire economies depend. While most scientists accept that nation 
states should have the authority to carry out targeted surveillance against obvious 
miscreants, they insist that it should not undermine the Internet’s central place as a 
facilitator of free speech and innovation (Rogaway, 2015). 
 Those who privilege secure systems and a robust Internet enjoy increasingly 
powerful corporate allies. Large numbers of companies and individual computer users 
subscribe to protection from specialist online security companies such as AVG, 
Symantec, and Norton. These companies gather a great deal of data about network 
activities, making it more difficult for government hackers to hide their trail. Typically, 
Symantec discovered that hundreds of hard drives had been compromised at source 
during their manufacture and were secretly pre-programmed to send their data back to 
Internet sink holes run by western intelligence agencies (Alrwais, 2016). Not only is 
this bad news for the perpetrators who hoped that their actions would remain secret for 
a long time, but also such activities provoke the technology community upon which 
they ultimately depend. These issues also beg the question of whether the Internet's 
heavy reliance on non-hierarchical, networked forms of governance is compatible with 
growing cyber-offence preparations by traditional state actors (Goode, 2015). 
 
 
The Technology of Leaking 
In September 1969, while working as a military analyst for the RAND Corporation in 
Santa Monica, California, Daniel Ellsberg came into possession of a secret Pentagon 
study of the Vietnam War. The history, which revealed that successive presidents from 
Harry Truman to Lyndon Johnson had repeatedly lied to the American people about the 
conflict, horrified Ellsberg and confirmed his belief that the conflict was both immoral 
and unwinnable. Believing that the public had a right to know, he put the first of the 47 
volumes in his briefcase, prayed he would not be stopped by security guards, and ferried 
it to a small advertising company in West Hollywood, where there was a Xerox 
machine. ‘It was a big one, advanced for its time, but very slow by today’s standards’, 
he recalls (Ellsberg, 2003: 301). Night after night, for 18 months, he laboured to copy 
all 7,000 pages of the study, at ten cents a page, often getting home at dawn. Eventually, 
in late spring 1971, he passed copies of what became known as the “Pentagon Papers” 
to the New York Times. In the White House, Richard Nixon would later lament (in a 
conversation, like many others, the disgraced 37th president generously taped for the 
historical record), ‘we have the rocky situation where the sonofabitching thief is made 
a national hero and is going to get off on a mistrial. And the New York Times gets a 
Pulitzer Prize for stealing documents’ (Ellsberg, 2003: 457). 
Today, technology has advanced to the point where whistle-blowers no longer 
require all night sessions with a photocopier to steal classified material. For the national 
security state, IT has become a double-edged sword. On the one hand, positively, it has 
allowed for the collection and storage of huge quantities of information necessary for 
contemporary security and surveillance. On the other hand, negatively, it has 
undermined a central pillar of secrecy. At the start of the computer age, information 
was housed on isolated mainframes and if someone wanted to move it into the public 
domain, they would have to print it and somehow evade security guards. If the material 
was particularly voluminous (typically on the scale of the Manning or Snowden leaks), 
this was near impossible. Today, by contrast, enormous quantities of data reside on 
personal computers with connectors for a small copying device such as flash drives, 
rendering it much easier to pilfer information and avoid detection (Massey, 2013). 
Unlike in Ellsberg’s day, when the only option for disseminating the material was going 
to the press or writing a memoir, leakers can now approach websites like WikiLeaks 
who, with anonymising software, will release it world-wide in a matter of seconds. 
Chelsea Manning smuggled 1.6 gigabytes of highly classified text files out of a US 
Army base in Iraq on rewritable compact discs – disguised as music by Lady Gaga – 
before downloading them onto a pen drive no longer than the length of a fingernail. 
Days later, the material was online, impossible for officials to retrieve.  
The change to a mode of direct dissemination is important, since newspaper 
editors often constituted a middle way between openness and secrecy. When journalist 
Dana Priest revealed the existence of secret prisons in three European countries in 
November 2005, officials persuaded her editors to delay the story and keep the 
identities of those countries a secret, to her obvious vexation (Priest, 2005). Even 
Snowden displayed a touching and old-school faith in traditional media, asking editors 
and journalists to decide which of his reported 200,000 documents should be released 
to the public and which should be held back in the cause of national security. Here too 
there was some uneasy negotiation between securocrats and editors. But increasingly, 
the temptation for leakers is to undertake a direct dump using anonymising software, 
not least because anything more complex might well result in prison or prolonged exile. 
Paradoxically, the use of intelligence methods to track down the sources of journalists 
makes disgruntled officials more likely to leak directly and indiscriminately via a 
website, avoiding interaction with the press. 
While the Snowden revelations were accompanied by a moral panic focusing 
on the digital private lives of citizens, governments are also running scared of 
technology, at least from the perspective of protecting secrets. Highly-regarded 
computer security expert Bruce Schneier has predicted that just as efforts to stop file-
sharing by the music and movie industries have failed, so will attempts to prevent the 
technology-enabled whistle-blower. Since 2010, a host of WikiLeaks imitators have 
burst forth onto the Internet, entice others to leak secrets. They include: 
BrusselsLeaks.com (focusing on the European Union); BalkanLeaks.eu (the Balkans); 
IndoLeaks.org (Indonesia); Rospil.info (Russia); GreekLeaks.org (environmental 
issues); and OpenLeaks.org, led by a number of former WikiLeaks employees (Sifry, 
2011). Large news organizations are looking to create their own encrypted electronic 
drop boxes, giving would-be leakers the opportunity to submit sensitive material 
directly, thus cutting out problematic middlemen like Julian Assange. In 2011 New York 
Times Executive Editor Bill Keller confirmed that the paper was discussing options for 
‘an EZ pass lane for leakers’ (Calderone, 2011). For secret keepers, this conjures up the 
prospect of a journalism arms race to acquire large-scale leaks.   
More fundamentally, technology is eroding the ability of states to do anything 
secretly. This is illustrated by the proliferation of commercial satellite imagery. Once 
the exclusive purview of government, in recent years, big technology companies have 
made giant strides in the development of high-resolution satellites and mapping 
applications, offering opportunities for global civil society to learn about secret 
geographical spaces, from espionage installations to nuclear facilities (Perkins & 
Dodge 2009). In 2009, the press in Pakistan published old Google Earth satellite photos 
showing American predators parked on the runway of a local airbase in 2006, thus 
confirming the US drone campaign in the country (Shachtman, 2009). In October 2012, 
Cryptome, a website dedicated to document disclosure from the national security 
sphere, posted pictures of a secret CIA training facility in Harvey Point, North Carolina, 
discovered on Bing Maps, which had served as the rehearsal site for the Navy SEAL 
raid on Osama Bin Laden (Cryptome, 2012). Most recently, in April 2017, a minute-
by-minute log of a highly classified mission by a £650 million British spy plane near a 
Russian base on the Baltic Sea was recorded on a £2.99 mobile phone application called 
Flightradar24.com and shared widely on the Twittersphere (Nicol 2017). As cultural 
theorist Jack Bratich has argued, the growing availability of surveillance and imagery 
technologies on the open market has created the ‘public secret sphere’, where ‘secrets’ 





To speak of the ‘end of secrecy’ would be obvious hyperbole. Clearly, there will still 
be secrets and some things relating to national security will remain secret for a long 
time. Moreover, it is clear that governments are working hard to defeat transparency in 
the national security sector (Roberts, 2012). But the problem for government is that it 
no longer knows exactly how long it can keep things secret and this has a deterrent 
effect on future intelligence operations. For decades much of the CIA director’s 
morning meeting was devoted to worrying about what had been said about the Agency 
in the morning editions. But in the past, the information emerging about their 
clandestine activities was often limited and sometimes even several decades old. As 
current secrets become known sooner, the cost of unsecrecy becomes ever higher. 
When deciding whether to approve an operation, intelligence chiefs have long pondered 
how their actions will appear if disclosed in tomorrow morning’s newspapers. In the 
digital age, it is perhaps more accurate to think in terms of the ‘Tweet test’; in other 
words, how will this look in ten minutes, on the Web, in 140 characters?  
Governments are fighting back in a bid to offset this new reality. Increasingly, 
electronic programmes designed to profile government workers using algorithms tick 
away the background on government servers in an effort to identify “pre-leakers”. 
Although Chelsea Manning’s 35-year sentence was commuted by Obama in the final 
days of his presidency, she had still been imprisoned for 6 years and it is clear that 
intelligence agencies rely on the deterrent factor of lengthy prison sentences in their 
information assurance work. Yet the threat of incarceration alone is not sufficient. 
Increasingly, intelligence has moved away from a ‘defensive’ strategy of information 
control – i.e. saying nothing and releasing nothing – to a more ‘forward’ strategy that 
is designed to protect its reputation and promote public understanding of its work. We 
have heard government public relations staffs talk about “nation-branding”. Is it too 
adventurous to talk about efforts at “intelligence–branding” in the future? Some argue 
that this has been exemplified by the recent UK authorised histories of the Security 
Service and the Secret Intelligence Service and by the CIA’s cooperation with the 
makers of Zero Dark Thirty, the Oscar-winning film about the hunt for bin Laden. In 
April 2014, the UK government announced the appointment of an official with a 
professional background in public relations as the new Director of GCHQ, Robert 
Hannigan (Moran, 2013; Quinn, 2014). All this is part of the new infosphere and we 
will need to develop new ideas around government attempts to manage public 
expectations in terms of declassification and openness.   
Indeed, in the longer term, government will need to prepare for radical change 
triggered by Big Data. States increasingly claim that they need greater surveillance 
powers to prevent intelligence ‘going dark’ in the face of new forms of 
communications, but this is also a symptom of a shift away from intelligence towards 
information. We are moving into a new environment in which we need to think through 
the social implications of knowledge-intensive security. The Snowden episode 
signalled that intelligence is no longer owned by the intelligence agencies: instead it is 
owned by large corporations that are often multinational and in the future, it may even 
be owned by individual citizens with the skills to analyse large data sets. Indeed, there 
are already signs of this: the hunt for the Boston marathon bombers was aided in part 
by people on the Internet conducting their own crowd-sourcing of intelligence 
collection, piecing together cell-phone pictures and videos taken around the blast site 
by runners and spectators to form a picture of the suspects’ movements. In this new 
realm of superabundant information, it may be that states will no longer “create” 
intelligence they will merely co-ordinate and “curate” intelligence. This is hardly 
surprising given that Big Data is all about distributed networks, but the obvious 
corollary is that information will no longer a special badge for the initiates of an inner 
circle (Hall & Zarro, 2012). 
Citizens will also need to prepare for greater transparency. The advent of a 
world in which everything around us gathers data means that individuals must expect 
for less privacy and corporations less confidentiality. Silicon Valley will need to 
reconcile its utopian belief in internet freedom and openness with its dogged 
determination to protect the privacy of its users. A portent of future troubles, Apple’s 
refusal to hand over to the FBI encrypted information on an iPhone used by one of the 
San Bernandino shooters is an indication that cyber utopians want to have it both ways, 
as opponents of secrecy but also as advocates of privacy. 
The challenge is clearly to ensure that knowledge-intensive security promotes a 
more open, prosperous and sustainable society. Increased transparency brings its own 
problems, but we are unlikely to be able to turn back the clock. Instead, we need to 
ensure that our data is owned openly, democratically and horizontally by everyone. We 
need to think hard about the growing role corporations will play, the ideas they espouse 
and what the implications are for democratic control over security. So far, Silicon 
Valley has understandably baulked at the prospect of any pact with government in 
which they are legally compelled to scan the private messages of their customers and 
report suspicious content. This dispute, and others like it, will become the norm and 
government attitudes to issues like publicly available encryption will become the litmus 
test of liberal and humane values. Ultimately, as we move into an era when the real 
world can be recorded and perhaps even manipulated in real time by those with the 
right software exploits, perhaps the decline of absolute secrets and their replacement 
with mere “delayed disclosure” is not unwelcome.  
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